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introduction
In a number of recent publications, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler have
argued for a novel approach to the design of public policy.1Their proposal has
received a great deal of attention, both within academic circles and the public
at large. Drawing upon evidence from behavioral economics and empirical
psychology, the authors attempt to demonstrate that the conventional
antagonism between libertarians and paternalists within political theory
dissolves in conditions that obtain widely in public decision-making. Where
free choice and the promotion of individual welfare can coexist, the authors
believe that designers of public policy ought to be libertarian paternalists.
In this paper I criticize their proposal on grounds that the authors are
unable to sufficiently motivate the paternalistic element of their approach.
I argue that the empirical evidence cited by the authors is capable of
supporting a number of competing approaches, including what I call liber-
tarian utilitarianism and libertarian justice. Since the evidence that the
authors draw upon does not provide us any grounds for selecting between
these rival approaches, I conclude that Sunstein and Thaler are unable to
provide us with a convincing guide for the design of public policy. In order
to show that this is the case, I consider three arguments in favor of libertarian
paternalism, and find each lacking. I end with some comments about what
we can properly conclude on the basis of Sunstein and Thaler’s arguments.
In constructing their argument for libertarian paternalism, Sunstein and
Thaler draw upon a rich and interesting body of empirical results from the
Heuristics and Biases literature.2 This literature got its start in empirical
1 I will focus on Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, “Libertarian Paternalism,” and Sunstein and Thaler,
“Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron.”
2 Major contributions to this research have been anthologized in three volumes: Kahneman, Slovic,
and Tversky, eds., Judgment Under Uncertainty; Kahneman and Tversky, eds., Choices, Values, and
Frames; and Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman, eds., Heuristics and Biases.
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psychology, but has recently had enormous impact upon a number of
other disciplines including economics, law, and finance. Most important
for our purpose is the portion of this literature that concerns the relation-
ship between individual choice and the framing of decisions.
Since the 1970s, a vast amount of empirical evidence has been
accumulated showing that individual choices in a wide variety of
domains are not invariant over equivalent presentations of a decision
problem. That is, individuals respond in different ways to a given
choice, depending upon how it is framed. Sunstein and Thaler interpret
this evidence as follows:
Our emphasis is on the fact that in many domains, people lack clear, stable, or
well-ordered preferences. What they choose is strongly influenced by details of
the context in which they make their choice, for example default rules, framing
effects (that is, the wording of possible options), and starting points. These
contextual influences render the very meaning of the term “preferences”
unclear.3
Drawing on one of the most memorable experiments in the Heuristics and
Biases literature,4 Sunstein and Thaler explain:
Consider the question whether to undergo a risky medical procedure. When
people are told, “Of those who undergo this procedure, 90 percent are still alive
after five years,” they are far more likely to agree to the procedure than when they
are told, “Of those who undergo this procedure, 10 percent are dead after five
years.” What, then, are the patient’s “preferences” with respect to this procedure?
Repeated experiences with such problems might be expected to eliminate this
framing effect, but doctors too are vulnerable to it.5
The authors assert that our susceptibility to framing effects means that, in a
whole host of common situations, we lack stable preferences. In proposing
libertarian paternalism, they aim to show that such situations often involve
contexts of both public and private decision-making. As a result, they
argue that planners ought to design choices in such a way that individuals
are “nudged” towards making good decisions, even if they might not do so
on their own. One of their central examples concerns Carolyn, the director
of food services for a large city school system. In their example, Carolyn
must make a decision about how to arrange items in the cafeterias under
her control:
3 Sunstein and Thaler, “Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron,” 1161.
4 McNeil et al., “On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies.”
5 Sunstein and Thaler, “Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron,” 1161.
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Here are some suggestions she has received from her usually sincere but occasion-
ally mischievous friends and coworkers:
1. Arrange the food to make students best off, all things considered.
2. Choose the food order at random.
3. Try to arrange the food to get the kids to pick the same foods they would
choose on their own.
4. Maximize the sales of the items from suppliers that are willing to offer the
largest bribes.
5. Maximize profits, period.6
Sunstein and Thaler claim that the cafeteria director described above
cannot help but make a choice that affects the decisions of her customers.
Food must be arranged in some way, and the organizational strategy that is
adopted will help to determine what people eat. The reason that this is the
case stems from the (in this case, unproven) assertion that food ordering
influences food choice. That is, we are invited to imagine that in this
situation individuals lack clear, stable, or well-defined preferences about
what to eat. Given this lack, an opportunity presents itself: The cafeteria
director has the chance to promote better nutrition without having to
eliminate any of her customers’ options. For example, should she choose
strategy 1, more people might be induced to choose healthy options, but
those with a well-defined preference for a cheeseburger and fries will not
have had their freedom of choice restricted in any way. This is the sense in
which their proposal is “libertarian”: Their aim is to influence decisions
without constraining liberty. Thus, no options are to be eliminated, and
no significant costs are to be imposed on the selection of these options.
Central to Sunstein and Thaler’s proposal is their claim that evidence
from the social sciences justifies a distinctively paternalistic approach to
public policy. I will argue that this claim is false, that this research cannot
justify paternalism in particular. In what follows, I will consider three
different arguments purporting to justify the use of a paternalist approach
to public policy. The first argument comes from a series of publications by
Sunstein and Thaler written prior to Nudge. Here the authors assert
directly that paternalism in public policy is inevitable. The second recon-
structs the argument of Nudge, where the authors merely claim that nudges
are inevitable. Finally, the third provides a friendly argument of my own,
intended to establish that nudges ought to be paternalistic. I show that
none of these arguments succeed in establishing libertarian paternalism as
the proper approach to the design of public policy.
6 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 2.
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paternalism is inevitable
Starting in 2003, Sunstein and Thaler published a series of articles
advocating for a new way of thinking about paternalism. Libertarian
paternalism was proposed as a response to standard anti-paternalist
arguments concerning government ineptitude and intrusion. Relying
upon insights from the social sciences, the authors sought to demonstrate
that their form of paternalism was not subject to standard anti-paternalist
objections. In particular, in these early publications,7 the authors claimed
that the instability of our preferences made it the case that paternalism
in public policy is inevitable:
Once it is understood that some organizational decisions are inevitable, that a
form of paternalism cannot be avoided, and that the alternatives to paternalism
(such as choosing options to make people sick, obese, or generally worse off ) are
unattractive, we can abandon the less interesting question of whether to be
paternalistic or not and turn to the more constructive question of how to choose
among paternalistic options.8
Unfortunately, the authors appear to be running together two claims here:
The first is the claim that some sort of influence is inevitable; the second is
that the appropriate response must be paternalistic. In the present context,
“influence” merely entails that the decisions of public planners have an
impact upon the decisions of citizens or consumers. This kind of influence
is demonstrated by a large number of studies where the framing of a
decision directly influences the rate at which different options are chosen.9
It is clear to me that existing empirical evidence is sufficient to warrant the
conclusion that this kind of influence in public policy is indeed inevitable:
It is simply not possible to avoid having an impact upon the expressed
preferences of individuals when we go about designing public policy
instruments. As a result, I think we should accept this premise.
However, paternalism is not coextensive with influence: There are a great
many sorts of influence that do not count as paternalistic. If, in the cafeteria
example above, the director were to select strategy 4 (i.e., maximize bribes),
she would hardly be attempting to make choosers better off. As such, it
should be clear that the inevitability of influence does not entail that policy
7 See especially Thaler and Sunstein, “Libertarian Paternalism,” 176–177, and Sunstein and Thaler,
“Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron,” 1171–1190.
8 Thaler and Sunstein, “Libertarian Paternalism,” 175.
9 For a statistically striking example of this impact, see the famous Asian Disease Problem from
“Choices, Values, and Frames” in Kahneman and Tversky, eds., Choices, Values, and Frames.
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designers must necessarily act paternalistically. For their part, the authors
define the paternalistic element of their proposal in the following way:
The paternalistic aspect consists in the claim that it is legitimate for private and
public institutions to attempt to influence people’s behavior even when third-
party effects are absent. In other words, we argue for self-conscious efforts, by
private and public institutions, to steer people’s choices in directions that will
improve the choosers’ own welfare. In our understanding, a policy therefore
counts as “paternalistic” if it attempts to influence the choices of affected parties
in a way that will make choosers better off.10
What, then, is going on? Even on the authors’ own understanding of
paternalism, it cannot be strictly true that paternalism is inevitable. In
order to understand Sunstein and Thaler’s thesis, I think we need to
weaken our understanding of “inevitability.” What the authors seem to
be claiming is that once we eliminate all the strategies that are morally
intolerable, some form of paternalism is the only viable option. That is,
assuming that policy designers are even moderately well-intentioned, they
cannot but engage in paternalism. Even on this weaker reading, however,
Sunstein and Thaler’s claim is false.
The point is only that paternalism, in the form of effects on individual choices, is
often unavoidable. When paternalism seems absent, it is usually because the
starting point appears so natural and obvious that its preference-shaping effects
are invisible to most observers. But those effects are nonetheless there. Of course it
is usually good not to block choices, and we do not mean to defend non-
libertarian paternalism here. But in an important respect, the anti-paternalistic
position is incoherent.11
Even if we assume that policy planners are well-intentioned, however, the
instability of preferences should not lead us to conclude that paternalism in
public policy is – in any sense – inevitable. According to Sunstein and
Thaler, a policy is paternalistic if it attempts to make choosers better off. It
is simply not the case, however, that a planner’s good intentions will lead
them to choose policies that promote the welfare of choosers. To see why
this is the case, let us examine the predicament of a policy planner from a
very abstract level.
Imagine a choice architect who has to present a choice to the public.
There are a number of different potential frames for the choice, and she
knows that her decision about which frame to use will have an influence
10 Sunstein and Thaler, “Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron,” 1162.
11 Thaler and Sunstein, “Libertarian Paternalism,” 177.
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upon some people’s choices. As a result, she must rank the potential frames
in accordance with some standard, using the predicted influence of each
frame as a guide. Once she has determined which frame fares best against
her standard, she should employ that frame for the public choice.
Notice, however, that the above description tells us nothing about
which standard our choice architect ought to use to rank the frames for
the decision in question. Sunstein and Thaler assume that the appropriate
standard to use when evaluating frames is paternalistic: Frames that
promote the welfare of choosers are good; frames that do not are bad
(similarly, frames that promote the welfare of choosers more are better
than frames that promote the welfare of choosers less). The data on
framing effects is, however, unable to guide our selection of such a standard.
This is because the scientific evidence is entirely descriptive: It tells us that
we are often responsive to frames, and it tells us which sorts of frames tend
to have greater or lesser purchase on our decisions. On its own, however,
this data generates no prescriptions for public policy. To arrive at a guide for
the design of public decisions, we must import a moral standard from
elsewhere. It is only by relying upon extraneous moral considerations
that we can decide how we should rank frames. Since empirical evidence
is silent on this issue, the research cited by Sunstein and Thaler can be
used to support a number of rival guides for the design of public policy.
nudges are inevitable
In Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness we
find the authors once again arguing for an approach to public policy that is
both libertarian and paternalist. Whereas their prior arguments seemed to
have been intended for a largely academic audience, in Nudge they propose
a version of the same basic argument designed for popular consumption.
Once again, they endorse the design of public policies that “maintain or
increase freedom of choice” (this is the libertarian aspect of their proposal)
while promoting paternalist goals:
The paternalist aspect lies in the claim that it is legitimate for choice architects to try
to influence people’s behavior in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and
better. In other words, we argue for self-conscious efforts, by institutions in the
private sector and also by government, to steer people’s choices in directions that will
improve their lives. In our understanding, a policy is “paternalistic” if it tries to
influence choices in a way that will make choosers better off, as judged by themselves.12
12 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 5, emphasis in the original.
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In Nudge, however, Sunstein and Thaler abandon the explicit claim that
paternalism in public policy is inevitable. Given my concerns in the last
section, this ought to be a good thing, but their new argument seems
to rely upon a similar ambiguity in their understanding of “nudges.” The
authors claim that:
A nudge, as we will use the term, is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters
people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or signifi-
cantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the
intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting
the fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning junk food does not.13
Once again, I have no quarrel with this description of nudges, and I find
persuasive the authors’ claim that nudges in public policy are inevitable.
Our susceptibility to defaults, starting points, and the framing of decisions
shows that choice architects cannot avoid nudging us in certain predictable
directions. Sunstein and Thaler state: “In many cases, some kind of nudge
is inevitable, and so it is pointless to ask government simply to stand aside.
Choice architects, whether private or public, must do something.14
Unfortunately, the claim that nudges are inevitable can provide little
support for libertarian paternalism. We can agree that choice architects
necessarily influence the decisions of the public without agreeing about
what kind of standard ought to govern the design of public policy. Unless
we interpret Sunstein and Thaler to be making the purely stipulative claim
that nudges – in order to be nudges – need to aim at the benefit of
choosers, then there is no reason to think that all nudges must be
paternalist. Sunstein and Thaler don’t provide any argument for the
view that all or even most nudges will aim at paternalist goals. Instead,
they rely upon an unstated assumption that nudges must be paternalistic.
This assumption, however, is false. In what follows, I present two examples
of how we could go about designing non-paternalist nudges. These nudges
seek to preserve liberty while attempting to steer behavior towards morally
appealing but non-paternalistic choices.
A utilitarian nudge
Consider the following modification to Sunstein and Thaler’s cafeteria
example: Our fictional cafeteria director has to choose which item to spotlight
at the front of the line. She knows that placing an item in this location is likely
13 Ibid., 6. 14 Ibid., 237.
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to result in a large number of customers (those with unstable preferences)
choosing this item. Her two options for the spotlight today are as follows:
(a) Californian Mixed Greens with Poached Chilean Sea Bass;
(b) Farm-fresh egg salad on homemade bread.
Further, let us assume that the cafeteria director has the following beliefs:
(i) A diet low in saturated fat is good for her customers’ health;
(ii) Transporting food from far away is environmentally unsustainable.
On the above assumptions,15 I think that it is clear that if the cafeteria
director has her customers’welfare in mind, she will choose to place the greens
and sea bass at the beginning of the line (since this option helps to improve
the health of her customers). However, if instead she has the best interest of
peoplemore generally inmind, then she should choose the egg salad (since this
yields greater overall utility). If she chooses (a), she is acting paternalistically,
whereas if she chooses (b), she is being a utilitarian. In neither case, however, is
she making her decision on morally unreasonable grounds. If she chooses (b)
she is still well-intentioned, but she has simply chosen a different, utilitarian,
standard againstwhich to evaluate potential frames for her customers’decisions.
My concern here isn’t to establish how the cafeteria director ought to
structure her menu, but rather to point out that there is nothing in the
empirical literature that ought to incline her towards one option rather
than the other. Just as Sunstein and Thaler have shown that libertarian
concerns are –when preferences are unstable – reconcilable with paternalism,
we can see that the same is equally true of utilitarianism. Sunstein and
Thaler’s proposal ought to have no traction for the cafeteria director, unless
she has independently decided that her nudges ought to be paternalist
in nature. If she instead believes that she should nudge people towards
decisions that promote overall utility, then there is nothing in Sunstein
and Thaler’s proposal that should change her mind.
A Rawlsian nudge
We can also use empirical evidence of framing effects to construct nudges
aimed at promoting Rawls’ theory of justice (or any other theory of justice,
for that matter). Advocates of this sort of approach would claim that in
15 Let us also assume: (1) That this particular cafeteria is in Ohio, and (2) that, at least in this instance,
the utility of promoting environmentally sustainable agriculture outweighs that of promoting the
health of her customers.
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instances where individuals do not have stable preferences and where
the choice of frame does not curtail anyone’s options, those with the
opportunity ought to select the frame that serves to promote policies that
best comply with Rawls’ two principles of justice.16
As an example, let us consider a situation akin to the sorts of policy
decisions to which Sunstein and Thaler wish to see libertarian paternalism
applied: the situation of a legislator drafting a referendum on property
taxes. Imagine that our legislator knows that people are affected by
framing, and that she also knows that individuals are hostile to frames
that represent a move away from the status quo.17 She must decide
between two equivalent formulations of a proposal to raise taxes:
(a) Raise taxes by 2 percent over last year;
(b) Maintain the same rate of increase (2 percent) as in previous years.
Since (a) frames the proposal as a deviation from the status quo while
(b) frames it as a continuation of the status quo, it is likely that the second
proposal will garner more support than the first. Given people’s strong
bias in favor of the status quo, her choice could significantly influence
the referendum results.
Now, let’s further assume that our legislator believes that it is in the
interest of voters to have lower property taxes. If she follows Sunstein and
Thaler’s proposed standard for the evaluation of frames, she will rank the
above formulations in terms of their impact upon the welfare of choosers.
In this case, she should select (a), since it will incline voters with unstable
preferences to vote against the increase. But let us also assume that she
believes it to be the case that higher property taxes serve to improve the
condition of the worst-off citizens (who, for whatever reason, tend not
to vote). If she chooses to evaluate these decision frames in terms of how
they affect justice (as described by Rawls), she will rank them in terms
of their likely impact upon social fairness. In this case, she should select (b),
since it nudges those with unstable preferences towards endorsing
the proposed increase.
16 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice.
17 This is the highly pervasive status quo bias (see Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, “Anomalies: The
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion and Status Quo Bias,” in Kahneman and Tversky, eds., Choices,
Values, and Frames, 159–170.) When an option is framed in terms of a deviation from the status quo,
it tends to be greatly dispreferred when compared with frames that cast that same choice as a
continuation of the current state of affairs. Thus, people display a bias in favor of the status quo,
even when there is no cost to changes from the current state. This is important since it is often the
case that planners have discretion with regard to which state of affairs comes to be regarded as the
status quo.
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To be clear, I have not provided (and will not attempt to provide) an
argument demonstrating that nudges ought to be constructed in order
to promote justice or utility. In both of the above cases, I hope it is clear,
however, that it is possible to design nudges that are not paternalist. As a
result, we should conclude that empirical evidence of the instability of
preferences and of our susceptibility to the framing of decisions cannot
support Sunstein and Thaler’s endorsement of libertarian paternalism.
Since paternalism in public policy is not inevitable, and since nudges
need not be paternalistic, we require a different kind of argument in order
to establish libertarian paternalism as the proper guide to public policy.
In the next section, I try to construct such an argument on Sunstein and
Thaler’s behalf.
nudges ought to be paternalistic
In order to be charitable to Sunstein and Thaler, I will here construct an
argument attempting to show why, given the diversity of normative
standards available to us in the design of public choices, we ought to settle
specifically upon a paternalistic one. I have not been able to find such an
argument in their writings, but I intend this argument to be friendly to
Sunstein and Thaler’s approach. Despite its friendliness, however, I believe
it fails in its attempt to rescue their proposal.
It might be claimed that the moral and political conditions under which
choice architects operate necessitate, or at least ought to strongly incline
them towards, being paternalistic (as opposed to utilitarian or Rawlsian). In
particular, one might argue that choice architects, in virtue of their social
position, are morally required to act in ways that seek to benefit the citizens
and consumers whom they influence. This might stem, for example, from
a general obligation that those who wield power ought to use that power
for the benefit of those over whom the power is wielded, or it might result
from a kind of fiduciary duty to care for those who are under one’s control.
A fuller version of the moral argument in favor of paternalism might be
something like this: Choice architects have the ability to influence the
choices of all those who act within the scope of the choices they design. As
a result, whenever they have the ability to structure choices in a way that
will lead individuals to make certain predictable choices, they have a moral
duty to ensure that the welfare of choosers is maximized.18
18 I thank the audience at the Second Copenhagen Conference on the Epistemology of Liberal
Democracy for suggesting this argument.
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I think it is plausible to ascribe something like this argument to Sunstein
and Thaler, given how they respond to concerns about the possibility of
“evil nudgers and bad nudges.” In response to concerns that nudges might
be deployed not to the benefit of choosers but rather in order to serve the
interests of choice architects themselves, Sunstein and Thaler reply that:
We should create rules of engagement that reduce fraud and other abuses, that
promote healthy cooperation, that restrict interest-group power, and that create
incentives to make it more likely that the architects will promote the public
interest. In both public and private sectors, a primary goal ought to be to increase
transparency.19
Here they articulate the beginnings of a moral argument that would
attempt to ensure that choice architects operate with the public interest
in mind. The rules of engagement they sketch seem aimed at increasing
trust in institutions: They want to cultivate a reasonable belief that choice
architects will design public policy instruments in ways that serve the
interests of choosers.
There are, of course, a number of different ways that we might go about
trying to develop such an argument. We might try to tie the duty to act
paternalistically to something like the categorical imperative, or we might
try to ground it in widely held moral intuitions about trust and public
service. We should note, however, that any such argument must argue on
moral and not empirical grounds that choice architects are obliged to act
paternalistically. Thus, what this argument requires is a moral justification
of paternalism in these cases, and such a justification would have to
establish that the exercise of power over an individual morally obligates
the powerful to act in the interests of those whom they influence.
I suspect, however, that a utilitarian would be unmoved by any such
argument. Because choice architects have the power to influence decisions,
the utilitarian will claim that they ought to act in such a way as to
maximize overall utility (rather than maximizing the welfare of the subset
of individuals who happen to be the choosers). According to the utilitarian,
the moral thing for a choice architect to do will be to exercise their power
to influence others in such a way as to maximize utility. If that requires
that they act in ways that preserve or enhance the public trust, then a
utilitarian ought to be sensitive to those concerns. Much of the time,
however, it seems likely that the way to maximize utility will not involve
any paternalist goals whatsoever. Instead, the utilitarian will advocate for
19 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 240.
226 jamie kelly
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139179003.012
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Vassar College Libraries, on 13 Oct 2020 at 15:05:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
designing policies that sometimes sacrifice the welfare of choosers in favor
of greater increases in the welfare of non-choosers (i.e., third parties).
Similar considerations could be advanced for the Rawlsian, arguing that
the exercise of power ought to oblige the powerful to abide by principles of
justice. Just as the utilitarian will see the design of public choices as an
opportunity to increase utility, the Rawlsian will approach the design of
choice architecture as an opportunity to promote justice. Although it
might be the case that a Rawlsian will sometimes recognize the need to
promote social trust through the design of paternalist institutions, it isn’t
clear why such concerns would dominate. For citizens in a well-ordered
society, it seems likely that the baseline expectation would be that the
design of public institutions would be oriented towards the maintenance
of justice, and not the promotion of individual welfare. As a result, a
Rawlsian should not be particularly receptive to moral arguments in favor
of paternalism in the design of public policy. Given that the paternalist,
the utilitarian, and the Rawlsian disagree about what is just, we should
expect this disagreement to extend to questions about how we ought to
attempt to steer behavior. Further, these disagreements cannot be settled
by recourse to empirical evidence from the Heuristics and Biases literature;
such controversies are thoroughgoingly moral.
If we interpret Sunstein and Thaler as merely trying to establish that
paternalism is sometimes appropriate, then their argument is relatively
plausible. But if we interpret the authors as making the stronger claim that
paternalism is the only, or the most appropriate, standard for design of
choice architecture, then their arguments are insufficient. Indeed, the idea
that choice architects should not be sensitive to considerations of general
utility or social fairness seems obviously false. At times, even Sunstein
and Thaler seem to be inclined towards a number of non-paternalist policy
goals. Although they attempt to cast these goals in paternalist terms,
I think that a more careful analysis reveals that even they recognize that
non-paternalist goals are often perfectly appropriate for choice engineers.
To see this, consider first the humorous real-world example Sunstein
and Thaler use to introduce libertarian paternalism: the men’s rooms at
Schiphol Airport in Amsterdam: “There the authorities have etched the
image of a black housefly into each urinal. It seems that men usually
do not pay much attention to where they aim, which can create a bit of
a mess, but if they see a target, attention and therefore accuracy are
much increased.”20
20 Ibid., 3–4.
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With this example, the authors seem to be claiming that the designers
of airport bathrooms are justified in nudging users to improve their aim
on libertarian paternalist grounds. Upon inspection, however, this is
implausible. Is the choice of aim-improving urinals really to be justified
in virtue of the welfare of those who use the urinals? It seems, rather, that it
is consideration of the welfare of others (e.g., the janitorial staff ) or of costs
to taxpayers that provides the real justification for this kind of nudging.
After all, aside from extreme cases of bad aim, it seems that the welfare
of those who use the urinals is relatively unaffected by the choices of
airport planners. This, then, seems better described as a case of libertarian
utilitarianism than libertarian paternalism.
Something similar seems to be the case with Sunstein and Thaler’s
example of organ donation. Here the authors canvass a number of poten-
tial nudges aimed at increasing the size of the pool of organ donors
through the design of the choice architecture surrounding the default
position for potential donors: “A policy that can pass libertarian muster
by our standards is called presumed consent . . . Under this policy, all
citizens would be presumed to be consenting donors, but they would
have the opportunity to register their unwillingness to donate, and they
could do so easily.”21
Although the libertarian aspect of their proposal here is clear, the
paternalistic aspect is not. I take it to be rather implausible to think
that this kind of choice architecture can be justified on purely paternalistic
grounds. The likelihood of any one individual ever benefiting from an
organ transplant is very small, but there is a great social good that is
promoted by increasing the pool of donors. As a result, the justification
of such a plan should center not on the welfare of would-be donors
(i.e., the choosers in this situation) but on would-be recipients (this would
include choosers, but would also encompass a much larger class of citizens).
As a result, the most straightforward moral justification of this kind of
proposal appears once again to be utilitarian rather than paternalistic.22
Because both utilitarianism and paternalism share a focus on individual
welfare, it can be difficult to distinguish utilitarian and paternalistic
positions in political theory. Further, because the good of choosers is a
part of the good of all, paternalistic interventions in public policy will
21 Ibid., 177–178.
22 Similarly, nudges that are intended to save the world from environmental degradation (Thaler and
Sunstein, Nudge, chap. 12) seem to be better motivated by concerns about fairness to future
generations or overall utility than they are by paternalistic concerns.
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sometimes coincide with utilitarian ones. Unfortunately, this can lead us to
conflate utilitarian and paternalist justifications in public decision-making.
I hope it is clear, however, that the moral arguments supporting these
positions can lead to strikingly different practical consequences. Because
utilitarianism seeks to promote the welfare of all, it can require us to
sacrifice the well-being of the narrower set of individuals that occupy the
attention of paternalists. And because paternalism is focused on the good
of a particular class of people, it will sometimes conflict with the greater
good. Thus, utilitarians will demand that choice architects make decisions
that undermine the welfare of choosers, and paternalists will expect them
to make decisions that are, from the standpoint of overall utility, clearly
suboptimal. Although these kinds of conflicts may sometimes be obscured
by the superficial similarities of paternalism and utilitarianism, they are
pervasive in public policy.
The above arguments are not intended to show that Sunstein and
Thaler do not really endorse a paternalist guide for public policy. Many
of their policy proposals are clearly motivated in this way.23 What I hope to
have shown here is that their account cannot establish that the only
acceptable goals for public policy are paternalistic ones. Given that they
are themselves sometimes swayed by non-paternalistic motivations, we
ought to acknowledge that paternalism is not the only appropriate goal
for the design of public policy.
conclusion
At this point, I should say something about what we ought to conclude on
the basis of Sunstein and Thaler’s arguments. I agree with the authors that
the empirical research upon which they draw is of crucial importance for
thinking seriously about the design of public policy, and the authors
should be commended for bringing this research into broader public
awareness.24 I also appreciate their attempt to present a version of pater-
nalism that is compatible with freedom of choice.25 If the authors were
23 This is particularly evident in Part II of Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge (“Money”), where the authors
are concerned specifically with the personal finances of individuals, rather than with the global or
even national effects of financial decision-making. One can easily imagine circumstances where the
economic well-being of the individual investors under scrutiny in that section fails to coincide with
the greater good.
24 I rely upon much of the same research in developing my own account of the relationship between
framing effects and theories of democracy in Kelly, Framing Democracy.
25 For criticisms of this attempt, see Klein, “Statist Quo Bias”; Mitchell, “Libertarian Paternalism Is an
Oxymoron”; and Glaeser, “Paternalism and Psychology.”
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merely interested in pointing out a previously unheralded form of weak
paternalism, I would entirely applaud their efforts. Finally, I think that the
authors have succeeded in augmenting the rhetorical arsenal of committed
paternalists who must defend their view against concerns about govern-
ment ineptitude and intrusion.26 Unfortunately, the authors overreach,
claiming to have justified a paternalistic approach to the design of public
policy, when in fact they have not provided a justification of paternalism
at all.
What I hope my arguments above demonstrate is that the terrain in
which choice architects work is the familiar moral one in which we all
find ourselves. Just as we confront difficult choices between the welfare of
those close to us and those far away in our moral lives, or encounter
seemingly irresolvable conflicts between fairness and utility in the domain
of politics, we should expect the dilemmas facing choice architects to be
deep, pervasive, and difficult. The moral dilemmas facing choice architects
will, therefore, mirror those that confront individual agents, government
regulators, politicians, and legislators. In other words, there is nothing
special about the situation of the choice architect: They must contend
with the same set of moral and political controversies that we all encounter
in public life.
As a result, choice architects and those who direct them should not be
blind to the non-paternalist goods that they can help to secure, nor should
they think that their own moral landscape is simpler than it really is.
Sunstein and Thaler have shown that it is possible to steer our decision-
making without coercing us, without altering our incentives, and even
without changing the information we have available to us. For this I think
they should be commended. Unfortunately, they seem to think that this
makes choices about public policy easier than it in fact does. If anything,
the fact that our choices are susceptible to the framing of decisions does
just the opposite: It moves difficult choices about political philosophy
directly into the design of public life.
26 This, for example, seems to be their aim in an earlier publication, when the authors interpreted
much of the same empirical literature as motivating a kind of anti-anti-paternalist argument:
“[B]ounded rationality pushes toward a sort of anti-antipaternalism – a skepticism about
antipaternalism, but not an affirmative defense of paternalism” (Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler,
“A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,” 1541).
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